Abstract. We evaluate constructions for building pseudo-random functions (PRFs) from pseudo-random permutations (PRPs). We present two constructions: a slower construction which preserves the security of the PRP and a faster construction which has less security. One application of our construction is to build a wider block cipher given a block cipher as a building tool. We do not require any additional constructions|e.g. pseudo-random generators|to create the wider block cipher. The security of the resulting cipher will be as strong as the original block cipher.
Introduction and Background
In this paper we examine building psuedo-random functions from pseudo-random permutations. There are several well known constructions for building pseudorandom permutations from pseudo-random functions, notably LR88]. However, the only results we are aware of for going in the reverse directions are the recent results of Bellare et. al. in BKR98] 1 . One primary justi cation for building pseudo-random functions is that it allows one to use the results of Bellare et. al. BDJR97 ] to produce an n-bit cipher that can be used to encrypt more than 2 n=2 blocks. Due to birthday attacks, nbit permutations will leak information about the plaintext after 2 n=2 blocks. By closing the loop between pseudo-random functions and permutations, we can also accomplish a number of things: widening the block width of a cipher, creating a provably secure 1-bit cipher feedback mode, and building encryption functions secure for more than 2 n=2 blocks. Given the plethora of existing practical block ciphers, it would be nice to be able to create pseudo-random functions from them directly without having to resort to building new primitives from scratch.
Our work extends previous work on pseudo-random functions (PRFs) and permutations (PRPs). PRFs and PRPs were initially de ned in GGM86] as functions (resp. permutations) which a polynomially-bounded attacker cannot to distinguish from truly random functions (resp. permutations) with more than ? The full paper is available at http://www.counterpane.com/publish-1998.html.
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We were unaware of these results when we originally wrote our paper, but they were instead pointed out to us by an anonymous referee. neglible probability. A more recent paper by Bellare et al. BDJR97] evaluates four di erent notions of security and applies those notions to the de nitions of PRFs and PRPs. In addition, M. Luby has written a book on pseudorandomness which provides an excellent summary of the theoretical constructions leading up to PRFs Lub96] .
Some authors have made a distinction between PRPs and super PRPs. With a super PRP, an adversary is allowed to query for inverse evaluations of the permutation LR88]. For our applications, we require the \super" variety of PRP. Therefore, for the remainder of this paper we shall consider only super PRPs; we usually omit the \super" pre x for conciseness.
Extensive research has been conducted on building PRPs from PRFs. f i 2 F n:n g and P A f = 1] denotes the probability that an attacker returns 1 when given f 2 P 2n . The result was generalized for m < 2 n=2 AV96,M92,P91b,P92] to Adv A = O(m 2 =2 n ):
Many di erent researchers have investigated variations of this construction AV96,C97,Luc96,M92,P91b] P92,P97,SP91,SP92,ZMI89a,ZMI89b] and even proposed di erent constructions M92,P97]. The exact nature of these constructions is beyond the scope of this document; they investigate building PRPs from PRFs, and we are interested in going the other direction.
In addition to designing PRPs from PRFs, some researchers have studied designing PRFs from smaller PRFs. Aiello and Venkatesan built a 2n-bit to 2n-bit function from eight n-bit to n-bit functions using a Benes transform AV96].
They achieved the notable bound that Adv A = jP A B = 1] ? P A f = 1]j = O(m=2 n ) after m queries, where A B is the result of executing the adversary A with the oracle instantiated by a function B from the Benes family, and A f is the result of running the adversary with a random 2n-bit function.
Aside from building wider functions, some researchers have examined building variable-length input PRFs (VI-PRFs). In BCK96], Bellare et al. formalize the notation of VI-PRFs and analyze the security of several constructions. Their functions are constructed using simpler primitives: xed-length input PRFs (FIPRFs) which were rst de ned in BKR94] in order to model the Data Encryption Algorithm (DES). One important feature of these papers is that they focus on concrete security analysis, which attempts to provide precise estimates of security, rather than being satis ed with asymptotic results. Bellare et al. initiated this study in BKR94, BGR95] .
When it comes to building PRFs from PRPs, though several di erent people have noted that a PRP can be used as a PRF with advantage O(m 2 =2 n ) for m < 2 n=2 (e.g. AV96]), there has been a notable lack of research in this area.
One recent exception is the excellent paper of Bellare et. al. BKR98] , which uses the notion of data-dependent keying to build a PRF from a PRP. Their results present strong evidence for the security of their PRP!PRF construction, and they take some initial steps towards a more complete analysis of its strength against computationally-bounded adversaries. One of the most appealing features of their construction is its practicality: the construction is very simple, and performance is degraded by only a factor of two (or less, when in stream cipher modes). It should be possible to use their re-keying construction in the applications found in Section 3, as a drop-in replacement for our PRP!PRF construction. This would provide corresponding improvements in performance; the tradeo is that the available security results are weaker for the re-keying construction.
One interesting motivation for building PRFs from PRPs is that we could build larger PRPs from smaller PRPs by rst constructing PRFs from the PRPs, using the results of AV96] to strengthen the function, and nally using one of the many results available for building PRPs from PRFs. This is in fact the approach we take in our paper, and it provides the rst useful technique (which we are aware of) for securely increasing the block width of a trusted block cipher.
The format of the rest of our paper is as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our two constructions for producing PRFs from PRPs: ORDER(P ) j:k i and TRUNCATE(P ) n?m n . In Section 3 we apply our constructions to a few di erent problems and give descriptions of our solutions. Finally, in Section 4 we analyze the security of the constructions presented in Section 2.
Notation
In this section we introduce some of the notation we will use through the rest of the paper: R n Z n 2 , the set of all n-bit blocks.
IP n The symmetric group on 2 n elements (speci cally, the set of all permutations on R n ). Here the expression p(0; x) stands for the result of applying p to the concatenation of the bit 0 and the n-bit value x.
Note, this construction is really a special instance of a much more general construction given in the next two sections. However, for our analysis we found it much simpler to analyze this simple case (in a later section) and extrapolate to the more general case.
2.2 Wider Outputs: ORDER(P ) n:2 k?1 m n+km Of course, in practice a PRF with a 1-bit output is rarely useful. Fortunately, there are some simple techniques to build wide-output PRFs from PRPs with a 1-bit output.
One basic approach is to observe that j = 2 k (independent) PRFs from IF n:m su ce to build a PRF on IF n:jm . This yields the following construction. Given a PRF F 2 IF n+k:m , we build a wider PRF G 2 IF n:2 k m by G(x) = (F (0; x); F(1; x); : : : ; F(2 k ? 1; x)):
This construction has the disadvantage that it reduces the input size slightly, which can be a problem for some applications. Of course, this does not produce an optimal construction. We leave the analysis to Section 4, but in fact the next construction is optimal. By optimal we mean that it divides the set of permutations IP n into equally-sized equivalence classes such that each equivalence class has an odd number of permutations. This implies that we cannot divide the equivalence classes any further and still expect to have equally-sized equivalence classes.
2.3 Wider Outputs, E ciently: ORDER(P ) n:2 m ?1 n+m As one might expect, the construction of the previous section fails to extract all of the possible bits from a permutation. In some cases we can nearly double the number of bits that we obtain from a given permutation p by extracting more information about the sorted order of p(x). To be more precise, we start by creating 2 n perfectly-balanced binary trees with 2 m ?1 nodes (i.e. each one has height m?1) and uniquely assign each tree to a di erent n-bit value x. Hence tree x will correspond to f(x). For any given tree, each node has three values associated with it: a n + m-bit value X(x), a 1-bit value Y (x), and a m-bit value Z(x), which serves to identify the node. For ease of exposition, we assign Z(x) so that the root node has Z(x) = 0, the left child of a node has the value 2Z(x) + 1, and the right child of a node has the value 2Z(x) + 2 (implying Z is independent of x so we can drop it). This assigns each node a unique m-bit value and allows us to associate bit i of f(x) with the Y (x) value of node i. We can use this latter technique to build a PRF in IF m:n using a permutation in IP a where a = d m+log 2 (n+1)+1 e. It will require d log 2 (n+1)+1 e invocations of E per invocation of IF m:n . Note, if n 6 = 2 l ?1 for some l, we will actually obtain a wider output than n bits. In that case we can simply truncate the output to n bits and retain the security of the PRF.
While this construction provably transfers (essentially) all of the security of the underlying block cipher to the PRF, the disadvantage is that it has poor performance: we can get a 57:127 PRF that's provably as strong as DES (and hence a 57:64 PRF), but it requires 128 queries to DES per PRF computation.
2.4 TRUNCATE(P ) n?m n Our second construction has much better performance, but uses a very di erent idea: we merely truncate a few bits of the output of the underlying block cipher, so the PRF can be almost as fast as the block cipher. Formally, let p 2 IP n be a random permutation. We assign a function f p 2 IF n:n?m by f p = g p where g : R n ! R n?m denotes the function which truncates the high m bits from its input. For a PRP family f k g the resulting PRF family would be ff k g.
The disadvantage to this approach is that it doesn't preserve the security of the underlying block cipher nearly as well: our proofs only work when the attacker has at most O(minf2
; 2 2(n?m)=3 g) chosen texts available to him, where n is the block width of the underlying cipher and m is the number of truncated bits. In practice, this means that we can prove security up to O (2   4n=7   ) chosen texts by truncating m = n=7 bits, but our analysis degrades too much to be provide better bounds for larger m.
Applications
There are several nice applications of our result. Probably one of the most interesting is that we \close the loop" between PRFs and PRPs. Luby-Racko LR88] gave a nice PRF ! PRP construction; we have now shown how to go the other direction 3 . We explore two additional possibilities in the next sections. There are others listed below, but due to a lack of time and space we have omitted further analysis of these ideas. Hence we pose them as open problems for further study.
1. Building MACs (or possibly hash functions) with provable security. The disadvantage is that they are likely to be very slow. 2. Building provably-strong PRNGs out of our constructions for provably-strong PRFs. Such a tool might be used for session key derivation, for example. The advantage is that in many cases (depending upon the application, of course) the PRNG isn't performance-critical, so slow techniques are still interesting if they have notable security advantages. 3. Building provably-strong stream ciphers from our constructions for provablystrong PRFs. By running a good PRF in counter mode, you can get security past the birthday bound. In contrast, 64-bit block ciphers typically run into security problems when used in a standard chaining mode to encrypt more than 2 32 known texts, no matter how strong the cipher is. Bellare et. al. have explored this application further in BKR98].
Building Wider Block Ciphers
Techniques for building wider block ciphers are especially relevant as the AES standards e ort ramps up. The problem with most existing ciphers, such as Triple-DES, is that they o er only 64-bit blocks, and thus fall prey to certain birthday attacks that can work with only 2 32 texts or so. (The matching ciphertext attack is one example.) As network communication speeds rise, this limit becomes increasingly concerning: for instance, on a 1 Gbit/sec encrypted link, we expect that information about two plaintext blocks will leak after only 6 minutes or so. The only solution is to move towards ciphers with wider block lengths, but if this involves a full cipher redesign, then we may forfeit the insights provided by more than two decades of analysis on DES and Triple-DES. This motivates our search for a construction which can provably retain the time-tested security level of Triple-DES while providing a wider block length.
This paper provides new results in this area. If we have a trusted cipher, then we can model it as a PRP family. Using one of our constructions we can construct a PRF family, use the Benes transform AV96] to create a wider PRF family, and nally use Luby-Racko to create a PRP family again. The nice thing is that the resulting PRP family will be almost four times as wide as the original construction. Furthermore, we will be able to provide provable security reductions to show that the widened cipher is likely to be strong if the original cipher is secure.
We will focus on a particular example and consider Triple-DES. Hence let n = 64 and P = fE k g be the Triple-DES family where E k (X) denotes encryption with key k and plaintext X. Also suppose that P is (t; q; e) secure. Then using ; of course, each invocation of P 2 encrypts 220=64 times as many bits as P, so the performance of the widened cipher P 2 will be 1536 64=220 447 times worse than Triple-DES. This is de nitely very slow, but it is provably secure! An alternative to using Luby-Racko is to use a construction by M. Naor and O. Reingold NR96] . There you get a twofold speed-up in execution and we only require 768 invocations of Triple-DES. This translates to a total of roughly 223 times worse performance than Triple-DES. The advantage, of course, is that the resulting cipher is that we have removed the 2 32 -texts limitation on the security of Triple-DES. Note: the security proof of the Luby-Racko construction given in LR88] actually assume that the gi are independent; but the proofs in NR96] remove that restriction.
Our construction uses the Benes transform only for technical reasons. The reason we can't apply the Luby-Racko construction directly to our PRF family F is that a 4-round Luby-Racko cipher with m-bit blocks is only secure up to 2 m=4 texts; with m = 2 58, the security level would be too low, so we build a double-width PRF family F 2 to increase m. However, eliminating the Benes transform could produce signi cant performance speedups, so this motivates the search for PRP constructions with better security. For example, by using Patarin's recent results on the 6-round Luby-Racko construction P98], we can build a widened cipher P 3 P 116 that is secure with up to about minfq; 2 43:5 g texts; by using single-DES instead of Triple-DES as our starting point, we can get a 116-bit cipher which is provably as secure as DES and has performance about 212 times worse than DES (or about 71 times worse than Triple-DES), though it has somewhat less security than our construction of P 2 . It would also be possible to use the TRUNCATE(P ) n?m n construction to build a double-width block cipher, instead of ORDER(P ) 6 4 58:63 as above. This would provide signi cantly better performance (the widened cipher could be as fast as 1/3 the performance of the original cipher). However, at present the available proofs provide no guarantee of security past about 2 36 texts, which is probably not a compelling advantage over the 2 32 birthday bound. As a third alternative, one could use the re-keying construction of Bellare et.
al. BKR98] to build F out of Triple-DES (say). Applying the Benes transform
and the Naor-Reingold construction would then provide a 256-bit cipher which is only 3 times slower than Triple-DES. The disadvantage is that the available security results are di cult to compare with the gures given above.
The examples we gave here usually resulted in a block cipher with a peculiar width. It should be clear how to modify this example slightly to generate (say) a 192-bit block cipher, by truncating F or F 2 to the appropriate size.
Applications to 1-bit CFB mode
We note that our main construction provides a way to increase the robustness of 1-bit CFB mode by tweaking the mode slightly.
The standard 1-bit CFB mode builds a function h : ZZ n 2 ! ZZ 2 by letting h(x) be the least signi cant bit of the encryption E k (x) of x under a block cipher E with key k. Then we build a stream cipher as C j = P j h(C j?64 ; : : : ; C j?1 ).
The problem is that we are not aware of any proof that CFB mode preserves the security of the underlying block cipher. Clearly all of the security of 1-bit CFB mode must come from the non-linear Boolean function h. Theorem 1 (in Section 4.1) guarantees the security of h against an adversary with access to q 2 n=2 chosen-text queries, assuming the underlying block cipher is secure.
However, for typical block ciphers 2 n=2 = 2 32 , which means that the \security warranty" provided by Theorem 1 is voided after 2 32 chosen-text queries ), but this is still signi cantly smaller than the O(2 n ) query security we would ideally hope to see. As we shall see, this hope is not unreasonable. most typical block ciphers are built to resist much more powerful adversaries, we would prefer to have better reductions.
We do not know of any better security proofs for 1-bit CFB in the literature, but we can improve the situation with a slight modi cation to the mode. Replace h by the function f E k de ned in Section 2.1. (We will need to sacri ce one bit of feedback, so that C j = P j f E k (C j?63 ; : : : ; C j?1 ), but 63 bits is more than su cient for practical purposes.) This requires two encryptions per invocation of f E k , so our mode will be twice as slow as the standard 1-bit CFB, but we do not expect this to be a serious problem, as implementors typically use 1-bit CFB mode for its resynchronization properties rather than for its performance characteristics.
Of course, the primary advantage of our 1-bit modi ed cipher feedback mode is that we can provide provable security reductions for f E k . If E is a (t; q; e)-PRP, then f E k will be a (t; q=2; e)-PRF. In short, our construction of f E k preserves the security level of the underlying block cipher extremely e ectively. Therefore, this modi cation to 1-bit CFB mode looks attractive for practical use.
Analysis
In this section we provide analysis of our ORDER(P ) j:k i and TRUNCATE(P ) n?m n constructions. In addition, we evaluate the security of a PRP family when viewed as a PRF family. 
Previous attempts
The nal xor of x into the ciphertext destroys the bijective property of p, so at rst glance f p might look like a reasonable candidate for a better PRF. However, we note that this construction has no better security than before. It can be distinguished from a random function with advantage q 2 =2 n+1 : merely apply the adversary of the previous paragraph to the function g de ned by g(x) = f p (x) x.
The security reduction we showed in Theorem 1 is su cient to show that PRFs exist if PRPs do, from a complexity-theoretic point of view, since the security bound it shows is exponential in n. Therefore, complexity theorists interested only in asymptotics need read no further. However, practical applications are a bit more demanding: they require concrete security guarantees.
We nd this O(2 n=2 ) level of security inadequate for practical applications.
Most block ciphers today o er 64-bit block widths, thus providing a convenient and e cient PRP with n = 64. For such ciphers, the above theorem provides no security assurances when adversaries are allowed to make q 2 chosen-text queries (or more). This is too weak for serious cryptologic use; we would prefer something that provides better resistance to chosen-text attacks. After all, the underlying block cipher typically provides better security than that|so it is natural to wonder whether we can do better. Is there a PRF construction that preserves the security of the underlying block cipher?
We show below that the answer is yes.
Analysis of ORDER(P ) n:1 n+1
We gave a description of ORDER(P ) n:1 n+1 in Section 2. We say that p is a random permutation (on R n+1 ) to mean that it is a random variable which is uniformly distributed over all elements of IP n+1 . Similarly, we say that f is a random function (from IF n:m ) when we mean that it is a random variable which is uniformly distributed over IF n:m .
We wish to show that f preserves the security level of the underlying PRP . Most of the work to be done is handled by a purely information-theoretic analysis, which ignores all issues of computational complexity. We tackle this in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. If p is a random permutation on R n+1 , then f p is a random function over IF n:1 .
Proof. Take any g 2 IF n:1 . It is clear that there exists a p 2 IP n+1 such that g = f p : for example, take the p such that p(2x) = 2x + g(x) p(2x + 1) = 2x + 1 ? g(x) 8x 2 R n :
Next we show that jfp : g = f p gj is a constant that does not depend on g, i.e. that there are an equal number of representative permutations p for all g.
First, suppose that g 1 ; g 2 2 IF n:1 are two functions that di er at exactly one point X (i.e. g 1 (x) = g 2 (x) for all x 6 = X and g 1 (X) 6 = g 2 (X)). Then we construct a bijective mapping : IP n+1 ! IP n+1 , which has the property that f p = g 1 exactly when f (p) = g 2 . This will show that there are an equal number of representations for any two functions g 1 ; g 2 which di er at exactly one point.
Then it will be easy to see that this implies the desired result, since for any two functions g; h 2 IF n:1 one can construct a sequence g = g 0 ; g 1 ; g 2 ; : : : ; g k?1 ; g k = h such that all the consecutive pairs g i ; g i+1 di er at exactly one point.
The mapping is built as follows. Take any input p; we de ne (p) = p 0 by
Now it is clear that f p 0 = g 2 if f p = g 1 , and vice versa. Furthermore, is an involution, so it is clear that it is a bijective mapping, as claimed. This completes the proof. u t
Once we have this nice result, extending it to the setting of computationallybounded adversaries is not so hard. It requires much unravelling of notation, but essentially no new ideas.
We rst introduce the notion of pseudo-randomness, to handle the most important case where the adversary is computationally bounded. Informally, saying that is a pseudo-random permutation (PRP) on R n+1 is supposed to convey the idea that it is computationally infeasible for an adversary to distinguish from a random permutation on R n+1 . (Some authors use the phrase \pseudo-random permutation generator" to refer to this object; for conciseness, we will omit the \generator" term throughout this paper.)
We formalize this notion as follows. An adversary is an oracle machine B p;p ?1 ; ; ?1 which outputs a 0 or 1 (according to whether it thinks p is truly random or is drawn from the family f k : k 2 Kg). It takes four oracles as inputs: a test permutation p (which outputs p(x) on input x) along with its inverse p ?1 , and an oracle for (which outputs k (x) on input k; x) as well as an oracle for ? where r is a random permutation and k is uniformly distributed over K. More formally, we say that is a (t; q; e)-PRP if the advantage of any adversary which is allowed at mostueries (total) to the rst two oracles and t o ine work is at most e. This models a block cipher which is secure with up to q adaptive chosen-plaintext/ciphertext queries and t trial encryptions. See BKR94, BGR95] for more information about (t; q; e) security. We can de ne a (t; q; e)-PRF (pseudo-random function) in a similar fashion. In this de nition, an adversary is an oracle machine A g; ; ; ?1 with access to four oracles: a function g which outputs g(x) on input x, an oracle which outputs k (x) on input k; x, and two oracles ; ?1 for the PRP class (as above). We where s is a random function and k is uniformly distributed over K. In the cases that we are most interested in, we have k = f k . We say that is a (t; q; e)-PRF if all adversaries A which make at most q oracles queries (total) to g; and perform at most t computations obey Adv A e.
Note that it is important to include the oracles for ; ?1 in the de nition of a (t; q; e)-PRF. In what follows, we will be interested in PRFs built from a PRP . Here models a block cipher; we assume the algorithm is publicly known (by Kerchko 's principle), so anyone trying to attack f can freely compute k (x) on any chosen inputs k; x. This required us to extend the standard de nition of a PRF to model this situation.
With those preliminaries out of the way, we may proceed to the rest of the analysis. We get the following pleasing consequence of Theorem 2 whose proof we leave to the appendices. To build the map , we need merely look at the binary tree we constructed for x = 0. (Actually we must consider a slightly expanded version of the tree in which the leaf nodes of our original tree are expanded into two children containing the values p(0; Z; x) and p(1; Z; x).) Starting with i = 0, we compare bit i of f 1 (0) and f 2 (0) and swap the left and right subtrees of node i if f 1 (0) and f 2 (0) di er in bit i. Note, this may destroy the original equality of bits j > i for f 1 (0) and f 2 (0) so in evaluating bit i we assume that f 1 (0) has the value denoted by the most recent tree. The end result is a series of subtree swaps for evaluating f 1 (0) which are clearly reversible.
The subtree swaps speci ed will remap values of a permutation to values of another permutation and we take to be that map. It is clearly onto and hence bijective. This completes the proof of the theorem. Our analysis above used a strongly information-theoretic framework: rst, we showed that the construction produces a random function when fed a random permutation (Theorem 2), and then all the desired pseudo-randomness results just fall out trivially from that. This framework is desirable because it makes the analysis relatively simple; however, we showed in Lemma 1 that it imposes serious limitations on the performance of the resulting constructions. The above bound essentially shows that, to achieve better performance, we'll need to do abandon the information-theoretic framework and take another approach. This we do below.
4.4 Analysis of TRUNCATE(P ) n?m n The construction of Section 4.2 is probably most attractive because it is so amenable to theoretical analysis, and because it preserves the security of the underlying block cipher so e ciently no matter how many chosen-text queries are issued. However, it also has a severe disadvantage for practical use: it is quite slow.
In Section 2.4 we de ned a PRF family TRUNCATE(P ) n?m n based on truncating bits of a permutation. The result trades o security for performance. Recall the construction: for any permutation k on R n , we de ne a function f 2 IF n:n?m by f k = g k where g : R n ! R n?m denotes the function which truncates the high m bits from its input.
We could instead have taken g to be any xed function g : R n ! R n?m such that each y 2 R n?m has 2 m easily-computable pre-images g ?1 (y), and the results would still apply. However, bit-truncation is attractive because it is both fast and amenable to a simple mathematical description 6 . Therefore, for clarity of exposition we concentrate hereafter solely on bit-truncation.
First we show that if is a random permutation, then f is a pseudo-random function. The following theorem proves that, roughly speaking, Adv A is negligible while q minf2 u t This shows that truncating some bits from the output of k gives slightly better security. For m n=7, the theorem says that truncating m bits adds nearly m=2 bits of security against adaptive chosen-text attacks to the PRF k .
However, for m > n=7, the second term in e dominates (in that it is largest and hence limits q), and our analysis does not provide better security reductions when increasing m past n=7. We believe that these limits are not inherent, but rather are a re ection of the inadequacy of our analysis. As an illustration, the best attack we can nd needs q = O(2 (n+m)=2) texts to distinguish f from random with signi cant advantage (see Theorem 8), so this leaves a substantial gap between the upper and lower bounds. We suspect that a better analysis could provide a better security reduction. (However, we could be wrong.)
The main idea of the proof is to show that the probability of getting any particular set of outputs Y to a given set of oracle-queries X is roughly the same whether the oracle is instantiated \under the hood" by a PRF or by a truncated-PRP. We use this to show that any oracle algorithm A must behave almost exactly the same regardless of which type of oracle it is given. That follows just because A's execution can depend only on the list of inputs and outputs to the oracle. This can then be used to show that Adv A is small. Of course, our bounds only hold when q is small enough.
The rst step in the analysis is to compute the probabilities that a random function F and a truncated-PRP f will map X to Y . For F this is easy, but for f it is substantially harder. In the general case this gets quite messy, so to our bound on the advantage, so we have sacri ced tightness for tractability.) After that, all that is left is relatively straightforward computations (albeit in large quantities).
Theorem 7. If is a (t; q; e)-PRP on R n , then f is a (t; q; e 0 )-PRF over . 6 The study of the properties of bit-truncation may also have some independent interest, as several authors have already suggested applying a bit-truncation output transform to existing MAC constructions in hopes of improving their security (see, e.g., PO95]). Then our adversary outputs 1 (guessing that the oracle is f ) if r < q(q ? 1)=2 n?m+1 , and 0 otherwise. Using the techniques found in the proof of Theorem 6, we nd that this adversary operates with advantage (q 2 =2 n+m ). u t
Conclusion
We have presented two constructions for generating pseudo-random functions given pseudo-random permutations: ORDER(P ) j:k i and TRUNCATE(P ) n?m n . The former had the notable property that it preserved the security of the underlying pseudo-random permutation whereas the latter had the property that it was much more e cient. Unfortunately, the gain in speed results in a trade-o in security and the latter construction fails to preserve the strength of the underlying pseudo-random permutation.
Using our constructions we were able to solve a few di erent problems, including stretching the width of a block cipher while preserving the security. We also examined a secure 1-bit cipher feedback mode using a pseudo-random permutation.
